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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff has no common-law negligence claim against the United States 
because Utah's Dramshop Act preempts common-law claims. 
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, Plaintiffs' Complaint 
appears to allege causes of action based on both Utah's Dramshop Act and 
common-law negligence. Plaintiffs now acknowledge that they cannot proceed 
under the Dramshop Act because the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") does not 
waive the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to the Dramshop Act's 
strict-liability provisions. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 17-19. In lieu of that 
claim, Plaintiffs contend that they can proceed on a common-law negligence 
theory. In order to do so, however, Plaintiffs would have to base their negligence 
claim on facts that fall squarely within the terms of the Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs 
cannot do so because Utah's Dramshop Act preempts such a claim. 
Prior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act, this Court consistently 
followed the common-rule that a person or entity that served alcohol to an 
intoxicated person had no liability to a third party who was injured by the 
intoxicated person. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 1 P.3d 528, 532 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 531 U.S. 1011 (2000): but cf. Rees v. Albertson's, Inc.. 587 P.2d 130,133 
(Utah 1978) (recognizing a cause of action against a vendor of alcohol who sold 
the alcohol negligently and in violation of a statute to an underage purchaser). 
1 
In 1981, the Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act, creating a 
comprehensive system of liability on the part of purveyors of alcohol. That 
statute, together with subsequent amendments, provides a detailed procedural and 
substantive framework for claims against alcohol purveyors. Among other things, 
the Dramshop Act 
(1) designates the circumstances under which 
commercial alcohol providers may be held 
liable, 
(2) designates the more limited circumstances 
under which private alcohol providers may 
be held liable, 
(3) provides for vicarious liability of employers, 
(4) provides for the survival of a claim in the 
case of the death of a claimant, 
(5) establishes limits of damages recoverable, 
(6) establishes a two-year statute of limitations, 
(7) preserves claims with no damage limitation 
against the intoxicated person who causes 
injury or death, and 
(8) prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees who use their independent 
judgment in refusing to sell alcohol to 
persons described in the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-14a-101, et seq. (2001 Repl.). 
2 
In the 22 years since the enactment of the Dramshop Act, this Court has 
declined to expand the liability of alcohol purveyors by recognizing common-law 
claims outside the scope of the Act. See, ej*., Adkins. 1 P.3d at 533 (holding that 
a party injured by an intoxicated person cannot base a cause of action against a 
dramshop either on common-law negligence or on a violation of the Utah Liquor 
Control Act). Moreover, even if this Court would be inclined to recognize a 
common-law claim in the absence of governing legislation, the Dramshop Act 
preempts the development of common-law liability on the part of alcohol 
providers. Gilger v. Hernandez. 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000). The Dramshop Act 
preempts such a claim even where the Act excludes that claim from its coverage. 
Id at 307-10. 
In Gilger. the plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries they suffered when 
they were stabbed by an intoxicated minor who had been served beer at the 
defendant's private residence. The plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the 
Dramshop Act because the version then in effect excluded claims against social 
hosts who served beer to minors.1 Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
'The Dramshop Act has subsequently been amended to include liability for social 
hosts who provide beer to minors. Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-1-105(2), 32A-14a-
102(2)(2001 Repl.). 
3 
defendant was negligent per se because she had violated Utah criminal law by 
providing alcohol to a minor. Id. at 306. 
The defendant argued that the Dramshop Act preempted the plaintiffs' 
common-law claim. The plaintiffs responded that the Dramshop Act did not 
preempt their common-law claim because the Act did not impose liability for the 
acts alleged in their complaint, and the Act did not explicitly bar general 
negligence liability. Id at 307-8. 
This Court held that the comprehensive nature of the Dramshop Act's civil-
liability provisions evidenced a legislative intent to preempt common-law 
negligence claims against alcohol providers. "The Act evidences an overall 
scheme of regulation of liability for liquor providers. Its very comprehensiveness 
suggests a purpose and intent to preempt inconsistent common law." Id at 309. 
The Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was preempted despite the fact that the 
Dramshop Act then in effect exempted the defendant from liability. "Even if this 
court were to find that there was common law liability for social hosts who serve 
beer to minors, such liability would be preempted by the Dramshop Act." IdL at 
308. 
This Court has subsequently reaffirmed its determination that 
comprehensive legislation preempts the development of overlapping common-law 
4 
claims, even where the plaintiff will be left without a remedy. In Gottling v. P.R. 
Incorporated, 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002), the plaintiff asserted a common-law 
wrongful-termination claim, alleging that she was terminated from her 
employment because of her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with the 
company's owner. The plaintiff did not seek recovery under the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act ("UADA") because the company employed fewer than 15 
employees and thus was excluded from the UADA's coverage. Instead, the 
plaintiff asserted a common-law tort claim based on an alleged public policy 
against sexual discrimination. Id. at 991. 
This Court rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the UADA 
preempted common-law employment-discrimination claims. The Court relied in 
part on the fact that the UADA contains explicit language stating that it is the sole 
basis for employment-discrimination claims under Utah law. Id. at 992. The 
Court also said, however, that the UADA would preempt common-law claims 
even in the absence of such language. The Court reasoned that it must defer to the 
legislature's policy decisions. "Simply put, we must not craft a remedy where the 
legislature intends no remedy to exist. To do otherwise trespasses upon the 
legislative domain and threatens the fragile balance of power upon which our 
system of government rests." Id. at 998. The Court held that the plaintiffs 
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common-law claim was preempted even though the plaintiff had no recourse under 
the UADA. "[N]ew statutory schemes, in certain circumstances, may preclude 
formerly available common law causes of action, despite leaving some individuals 
without a remedy." Id at 997 (citing Gilger, 997 P.2d at 309-10). 
The present case presents an even more compelling case for preemption 
because Plaintiffs' allegations fall squarely within the liability provisions of the 
Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs allege that alcohol was served to Mr. Valle when he was 
apparently under the influence of alcohol; that the service of the alcohol to Mr. 
Valle caused his intoxication; and that the collision that caused Plaintiffs' injuries 
resulted from Mr. Valle's intoxication. Complaint at 3-4, <H 8-10 (U.S. District 
Court record, document 1). These allegations would state a cause of action against 
a private person or entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(l)(b) (1999 Repl.). 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, their claim is against the United States, which has not 
waived its immunity from Plaintiffs' strict-liability claim under the Dramshop Act. 
Thus, the deficiency in Plaintiffs' claim is not the result of a gap in the Dramshop 
Act's coverage, but rather the result of the FTCA's preservation of the United 
States' sovereign immunity against "strict liability of any sort." Laird v. Nelms, 
406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972). 
6 
Plaintiffs surges I (IKI1 'fir- * ouii could overcome the United States' 
soveicigii immiiim v in nfher of two ways. First, Plaintiffs suggest that the Court 
i Mild ereate a system of negligence per se based on the criminal provisions of the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act ("ABCA"). See Plaintiffs' Opening Brie! ai 8-
10. Plaintiffs' theory is undermined by a comparison of those prov 
civil-liability provisions of the Dramshop Act. I he \B( 'A imposes o IIIHH il 
penalties for providing alcohol to the following i ateii* n itw < >1 pers<ins i 1) any ' 
person under the age . y eai s. i/. I .in \ \iei s<- HI W (I* I IS apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating ah ih< tin heNrm^"' or who the provider "knew or 
should i the circumstances was under the influence of 
iiitti'Xieafyig alcoholic beverages"; and (3) any "known interdicted persor " Utah • 
Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-203, -204, -205 (2001 RepL). These are precisely the same 
categories of persons listed in the Dramshop Act's provisions imposing 
commercial providers of alcoholic beverages. See Utah Code Ann. < 
102(l)(b)(ii) (2001 RepL). Thus, Plaintiffs'suggest ui tun 
liability directly in conflict with fact that the Utah 
legislature !- of persons in both the criminal and civil 
demonstrates its intent that injured parties should 
7 
not be allowed to rely on the criminal provisions to make an end run around the 
comprehensive liability provisions of the Dramshop Act. 
Plaintiffs' second suggestion is that this Court could fashion a unique cause 
of action applicable only to the United States. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 23-
24. This theory, while creative, would be ineffectual. The fundamental principle 
governing the United States' tort liability under the FTC A bears repeating: The 
United States is liable only to the extent "a private individual under like 
circumstances" would be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' 
proposed common-law claim would fall outside the scope of the FTC A, however, 
because it would apply only to the United States and not to "a private individual 
under like circumstances." Thus, the ironic result of Plaintiffs' proposal for a 
common-law claim targeted only at the United States is that such a claim would 
not meet the express requirements of the FTCA. 
In order to create a claim applicable to the United States, this Court would 
have to recognize a negligence claim applicable not just to the United States, but 
to all persons and entities. Injured parties would be able to pursue either a strict-
liability claim under the Dramshop Act, or a negligence claim, or both. While the 
creation of a second layer of liability would give injured parties more options, it 
would simultaneously nullify the legislature's decisions regarding the appropriate 
8 
balance betw, ^ npensation on the one hand, and protection of alcohol 
Commercial alcohol purveyors would be subject to a 
c i • -i * J of claims, and the duration of their potential liability would 'H 
extended from two years to four years. More importantly, commercial pin lv< >i 
would face a dramatic increase in their potential liability a i u I i n M 11. n u r o > s r > • \ i 
the same time, non-commercial alcohol provide! s <\ In> me I ublr under the 
Dramshop Act only for providing would be at risk for a wider 
variety of potential claims, i ilh yiiIifii»(o:t rlama^s. 
Thest u i I nsiderations facing the legislature when it 
enac *shop legislation. The fact that the FTCA excludes strict-
from its coverage is not a sufficient reason to upset the 
legislature's resolution of these issues. If public policy demands that the federal 
government bear liability under the Utah Dramshop u i 
consideration by Congress in its evaluation of the i v. 11 
immunity, or by the Utah legislature mpropriate type of 
proof to be required undei 
[Rjespect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking 
requires that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of 
the Legislature where disagreement is founded only on 
policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs 
reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate objective. Tn 
matters not affecting fundamental rights, the prerogative of 
9 
the legislative branch is broad and must by necessity be so 
if government is to be by the people through their elected 
representatives and not by judges. 
Gottlmg, 61 P.3d at 998 (citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 
1979)). 
In Gilger, this Court correctly concluded that the Utah legislature intended 
to occupy the field of dramshop liability when it enacted comprehensive 
legislation governing the civil liability of alcohol purveyors. There is no rationale 
or precedent for this Court to create a system of common-law liability that would 
directly conflict with the statutory system of liability already authorized under 
Utah's Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs' request that this Court do so should be rejected. 
Plaintiffs accurately point out that courts in a number of other jurisdictions 
have recognized a common-law cause of action against dramshops. See Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief at 12-15. The case law cited by Plaintiffs does not support their 
argument, however. Most of the cases arose in states without dramshop statutes. 
In the absence of dramshop legislation, of course, the issue of preemption does not 
arise. Moreover, those courts frequently relied on criminal statutes, like those in 
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which prohibit the distribution of alcohol 
to minors, inebriated individuals, or other classifications of persons. See, e.g., 
Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980); Hutchens v. Hankins. 303 S.E.2d 
584 (N.C. App. 1983). As discussed above, the Utah legislature has already 
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incorporated those class if icut i< HI*- 14 persons into the civil-liability provisions of 
the 1 h .mishop Ai (, I Ims, the circumstances that persuaded the courts in states 
fiiiitm diamshop legislation to fill the liability vacuum do not exist in Utah, 
Even where courts have recognized common-law dramshop 11 aims m 
jurisdictions with dramshop statutes, the courts have genei ally 11 vi >j: 11»ia I 
common-law claims only where expressly authorized hy sialnlc or where 
necessary to fill substantial gaps in tin: >,( it«!i< »f \ >'«n r^n/i1 Scy e.g , Largo Corp. 
v. Crespin, 727 V 2,d 10%, ! H7> " A - \nK^^f (tvcognizing a common-law cause 
of action wherr t '< 11 u r; u li. • 11.111 is I io|»statute governed only "extremely limited 
circumstances." i < • 11te s< • i v »cc of alcohol to "habitual drunkards" about whom a 
v^  ad been issued); Thaut v. Finlev. 209 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. App.), 
n v
 ; ; ; 3 N.W.2d 820, 821-2 (Mich. App. 1973) (recognizing a commc 
cause of action against a social host where the Michigan dramshc « t 
contained no provision for liability of social hosts); Trail v. Christiai .W.2d 
618, 621-25 (Minn. 1973) (recognizing a c \ action for the sale 
of "3.2 beer" where Minneso, excluded any liability for the 
sale oi _ r/i. ramshop statute preempted common-law 
claims ,i rages defined therein); Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., Inc., 
* i ^4-5 (N.C. 1998) (recognizing a common-law claim for the 
11 
negligent sale of alcohol to a minor, where North Carolina's dramshop statute 
expressly preserved common-law claims); Mason v. Roberts, 294 N.E.2d 884, 
887-8 (Ohio 1973) (recognizing a common-law cause of action where the Ohio 
dramshop statute applied only to the sale of alcohol to persons "blacklisted" on an 
order issued by the Department of Liquor Control). 
Plaintiffs rely primarily on Craig v. DriscolL 813 A.2d 1003 (Conn. 2002), 
where a three-to-two majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a 
broad common-law dramshop liability in the face of equally broad dramshop 
legislation. The United States submits that the Craig decision improperly blurs the 
division between the legislative and judicial roles. 
In Craig, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a common-law claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by Connecticut's 
dramshop statute. Unlike Utah's Dramshop Act, the Connecticut statute did not 
require any proof of a causal link between the providing of alcohol to an 
intoxicated person and the intoxication that caused the subsequent injury. The 
Connecticut statute provided for a damage limitation of $20,000. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that "recognition of a common-law negligence action neither 
conflicts with the act nor thwarts its underlying purpose.... The act provides a 
means of recovery for plaintiffs who are unable to prove causation and culpability, 
12 
subjecttoastatatoiylpi-iii.il • • •Kimages." 813 A.2dat 1014. Thecourt 
decided that because ol (lie modest damage limit in the Connecticut statute, it was 
appro)male in supplement the legislation. 
[The dramshop act] sets, in essence, a minimum recovery 
opportunity for persons injured as a result of the sale of 
liquor to an intoxicated person. By setting a floor, 
however, the legislature did not also intend to be setting a 
ceiling - - and we are free, therefore, to exercise our 
common-law authority to increase the recovery opportunity 
in circumstances where the state of mind of the bar owner 
warrants it In this manner, the tort action would 
supplement, rather than conflict with, the [dramshop] act. 
Id. (Italics in original.) 
By chanu'Um/iii!.' llh ( «nnecticut dramshop statute's $20,000 damage 
limitatic nimum recovery" and a "floor," the Connecticut Supreme Court 
seen is if > h,i ve considered the statute to be akin to a no-fault insurance polk \ \\ tr 
tin >se who were injured by intoxicated persons but who could 
negligence or causation. Thus, the Connecticut Supren ided that a 
broad tort cause of action would not conflict v\ remedial "floor" 
provided by Connecticut's dramshop statute. 
The United States submits (lut the dissent in Craig is the more well-
reasoned opim< dissent relied primarily on the fact that the majority"s 
creati* gligence cause of action would upset the legislature's policy 
13 
decisions with respect to the liability of dramshops, who prior to the adoption of 
dramshop legislation had no common-law liability. "[T]he majority eviscerates a 
scheme of recovery that the legislature crafted in reliance upon these very long-
standing, but now abandoned, common-law precedents." IcL at 1023. The dissent 
noted that the dramshop act was not an isolated statute, but rather a part of 
comprehensive legislation governing alcohol distribution and sale. "The 
pervasiveness of legislation in this area strongly suggests that the legislature, in 
enacting standards of liability for sellers of alcohol for damage caused by their 
intoxicated patrons, did not intend to leave for the courts the question of whether, 
and under what circumstances, liability beyond the statutory limits may be 
imposed on sellers for damage caused by their patrons." Id at 1025. The dissent 
also expressed concern that this upheaval in dramshop liability would have a 
significant effect on sellers of alcohol who had acted in reliance on the dramshop 
statute, such as by obtaining liability insurance consistent with the statute's 
liability limits. Id at 1026 n.6. 
Utah's Dramshop Act is more comprehensive than Connecticut's, and thus 
even more deserving of judicial deference. When the Utah legislature enacted the 
Dramshop Act in 1981, it did so against the backdrop of the common-law rule 
exempting dramshops from liability. The legislature determined as a matter of 
14 
policy that alcohol \H \ •> ft l a s should bear some responsibility for their actions. 
I! 11 * 1 (,' )2 i s I a t u i c \ I»«1 i "i • I-' h o w o A r er, merely impose negligence liability on alcohol 
I > 11 ]> \' 1111" t :•„ l! i * a pparent from the statute that the legislature determined that 
unlimited negligence liability would be too burdensome on both plaintiffs J U J 
defendants. Instead, the legislature imposed a form of strict ' 
plaintiffs of the burden of proving negligence and pi casei \ tie t • \w - (1 K 
circumstances that will give rise to liabn r the burden of proof 
required for plaintiffs to estabi : 
On the other hand Hit legislating • oncluded that alcohol providers should 
not be expose* financial liability. The Dramshop Act includes limits 
on damage c levied against alcohol providers. The Act limits the 
1 * ' ocial hosts to cases where alcohol has been provided to a mino 
addition, the Act establishes a shorter two-year statute of limitations 
brought under the Act. 
The terms of the Dramshop Act evidence J luLim nit! < >l considerations on 
behalf of both injured parties The issue is not whether this 
Court agrees with the J ^licy decisions in crafting the Dramshop Act. 
See Gottling v. F.K. incorporated, 61 P.3d at 997 ( "Th i s court cannot ignore or 
<l M ke illm ii a* tct because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of 
15 
wisdom is for the legislature to determine.'" (citing Masich v. U.S. Smelting. Ref. 
& Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 625 (Utah 1948)). Rather, the issue is whether the 
legislature intended to occupy the field of dramshop liability and thus preempt the 
development of conflicting common-law claims. As discussed above, the 
comprehensive nature of the Act demonstrates the legislature's intent to do so, and 
this Court correctly so held in Gilger. The Court should decline Plaintiffs' 
invitation to reverse course and override the legislature's policy decisions. 
II. Utah's Dramshop Act does not unconstitutionally limit Plaintiffs' 
remedies. 
A. Open-Courts Provision 
Plaintiffs contend that the Dramshop Act violates the open-courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution (art. I, § 11), if the United States is not liable under either 
the Dramshop Act or the common law. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 25-27. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, it is not Utah's Dramshop Act that bars their 
claim but rather the United States' sovereign immunity, which is preserved under 
the FTCA. Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs contend that there is a conflict between 
the FTCA and the Utah Constitution, their argument must fail under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2). 
Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribe of Texas v. Mattox. 650 F. Supp. 282, 289 (W.D. 
Tex. 1986). 
16 
Moreover, rinmhfiV ;n irnment would fail even if it were not barred by the 
Supremacy < lnn < I lie FTCA's limited waiver of the United States* immunity 
. »|K ii - ihr Jo. HID certain claims that injured citizens would not otherwise11 have. 
fact that Congress did not waive the federal govermi 
all claims by injured persons does not mean that K * \ "deprived" of 
anything. This Court has held that sovereign mimmiiiy dors not violate the open-
courts provision of the Utah Co11si 11111 >«i • i»« I»« Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah 1983), the plaintills yHij.;ii( ttaiiiajo-s (or losses suffered as a result of the 
alleged failure 11\ ilit: %l.iti ni I 'lid and its Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
to discharge litni <J,uuii »n functions with respect to the regulation of banks, 
dishu'i i o»i!i t»ranted the state's motion to dismiss in part on the basis ol I Huh'1. 
< rnmental Immunity Act. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the Governmei Act 
violated the open-courts provision of the i 11 s ( » 1 1 , 1 1 1 « • i Court rejected 
that argument: 
Sovereign immunity - the principle that the state cannot be 
sued in its own courts without its consent - was a well-
settled principle of American common law at the time Utah 
became a state Article L § 11 of the Utah Constitution, 
which prescribes that all courts shall be open and persons 
shall not be barred from using them to redress injuries, was 
not meant to create a new remedy or a new right of action. 
. . . Consequently, Article I, § 11 worked no change in the 
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principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity 
is not unconstitutional under that section. 
658 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also DeBrv v. Noble. 889 
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) (holding that the open-courts provision is not violated by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's preservation of sovereign immunity for 
negligent inspection of a building). 
The same principle applies to Plaintiffs' argument in the present case. The 
United States' sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' claim, and the fact that Congress 
has not waived immunity does not deprive Plaintiffs of any claim. Thus, even if 
the Supremacy Clause did not bar Plaintiffs' argument, the FTCA's preservation 
of sovereign immunity would not violate the open-courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution. 
B. Equal Protection 
Again, Plaintiffs' argument addresses the wrong statute. Plaintiffs' claim 
under the Dramshop Act fails not because of any deficiency in the Act itself, but 
because Congress has not waived the United States' sovereign immunity as to 
strict-liability claims such as those brought under the Dramshop Act. If Plaintiffs 
believe the FTCA violates their equal-protection rights, their argument must 
proceed under the United States Constitution. The United States has briefed this 
issue in the proceedings before the United States District Court, where it will be 
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decided after conclusion of the proceedings before this Court. See Defendant's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (U.S. District Court record, 
document 19) at 10-12. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the United States' Opening Brief, the 
United States requests that this Court answer the issues certified by the United 
States District Court as set forth in the United States' Opening Brief at 12-13. 
DATED this 2° day of August, 2003. 
PAUL M. WARNER 
United States Attorney 
iLSON 
United States Attorney 
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